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ABSTRACT
Intrusion Detection systems plays a crucial role in detecting malicious activities that
deteriorate the performance of the network. Mobile AdHoc Networks (MANETs) and Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a type of wireless networks that can deliver data without any need
of infrastructure for their operation. The distributed nature of these networks and the limited
resources available, pose a huge challenge for the security of a network. The need for an IDS that
can adapt with such challenges is of utmost importance.
Two IDS schemes are presented in this dissertation; the first scheme is based on utilizing
the promiscuous mode based on the node’s location in the simulated field. This scheme is called
the pseudo cluster head algorithm. The field is divided in four quadrants with a circle in the middle
of each quadrant. The node will be able to collect first hand data from the nodes in its radio range.
This node uses the C. 4.5 decision tree algorithm for classification purposes. Each node in the
proposed scheme transmits a signal called Anomaly Index (AI) to a manager node, which is a type
of super node that collects data from other nodes at different quadrants.
The second scheme is a cross layer-based IDS with two layers of detection. The first layer
is composed of dedicated sniffers that collects data from its neighbors using the promiscuous mode
and calculates a parameter called the ‘Correctly Classified Instance’ and forwards it to a super
node at constant time intervals called ‘Reporting Times’. The super node takes advantage of the
variance of the CCIs in the smaller size population which represents the number of malicious nodes
in the network is smaller than the variance of the larger size population which represents the
number of normal nodes in the network. Based on this concept, a new quantity called Accumulated
vii

Measure of Fluctuations (AMoF) is presented. Its core is based on calculating variability of the
CCIs collected by different DS with sliding window approach. Detection results for different node
velocities and power transmitted level is presented. The results show better performance when
dealing with higher transmitted power and low node velocity compared to other scenarios where
node velocity is high and transmitted power is low.

viii

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
The Mobile AdHoc Networks (MANET) are a type of wireless network that does not
require infrastructure for its operation. This feature makes it very appealing for rapid deployment
in harsh and challenging environments. There are many applications for these highly versatile
networks. The most important applications of MANETs are in support of military operations and
civil emergency deployments. Nodes in such networks have varying capabilities such as transmit,
receive, and route data packets. The transmitting nodes are called source nodes. The receiving
nodes are called destination nodes. The routing nodes are the intermediate nodes between source
and destination.
MANETs lack a centralized architecture which affects the level of security in the network
and increases vulnerability. Encryption helps as a first layer of defense but is not always adequate
to protect against adversaries. Most of security measures used to prevent intrusion in MANETs
will not eliminate the threat entirely, and there will always be a necessity for an intrusion detection
system (IDS) that can detect a wide range of threats that can hinder the network functionalities.
An IDS is a decision-making scheme that collects data regarding other nodes which helps
building a model that facilitates the detection process. It can be deployed on certain node(s) in the
network to perform the detection process.
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1.2 Contributions
•

An intrusion detection scheme is proposed based on cross layer feature collection from the
medium access control (MAC) and network layers. The proposed method employs a
hierarchical configuration that avoids using a clustering algorithm and, instead,
sequentially activates the promiscuity (ability to sniff all packets transmitted by nodes
within radio range) of the node based on its location in the network. The node in this case
acts as a pseudo cluster head (PCH) that collects data from its neighboring nodes in each
quadrant in the field and decides regarding other node’s status (malicious or normal). High
detection results were achieved.

•

Proposed a two-level detection scheme for detecting malicious nodes in MANETs. The
first level deploys dedicated sniffers working in promiscuous mode. Each sniffer utilizes
a decision tree-based classifier that generates quantities which is referred to as correctly
classified instances (CCIs) every reporting time.
A new concept called accumulated measure of fluctuation (AMoF) is introduced
at the second level of detection. The CCIs are sent to an algorithmically run super node
that calculates quantities, which we refer to as AMoF of the received CCIs for each node
under test (NUT). A linear regression process is then performed in parallel with the
calculation of the AMoF for fitting purposes and to set a proper threshold based on the
slope of the fitted lines. As a result, the malicious nodes are efficiently and effectively
separated from the normal nodes.
The proposed scheme is tested for various node velocities and power levels and
shows promising detection performance even at low-power levels. The results presented
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also apply to wireless sensor networks (WSN) and represent a novel IDS scheme for
such networks.
1.3 Roadmap to the Dissertation
A brief survey regarding different types of IDS’s based on their detection methodology is
presented in chapter 2. The characteristics of MANETs such as mobility models and routing
protocols are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 deals with the attacks that that affect MANETs
across physical, data link, and network layers. The detection schemes (IDS’s) are presented in
chapter 5 along with the tools used to build the IDS such as C.4.5 decision trees, random forest,
and linear regression. Finally, in chapter 6, future work along with a conclusion for the dissertation
is presented.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Introduction
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a key element in the integrity of MANETs. It is
considered the second line of defense [1]. In this chapter, different detection schemes are described
based on their detection methodology.
2.2 Detection Schemes in IDS for MANET
The IDS’s are divided based on their detection methodology into four main categories:
•

Anomaly-based.

•

Signature-based.

•

Specification-based.

•

Hybrid-based.

2.2.1 Anomaly-based IDS
According to Butun et al., in anomaly-based systems, an alarm is issued once there is a
deviation from normal behavior which exceeds a predefined threshold [2]. The main advantage is
the ability to deal with previously unknown attacks but with high false alarms. A brief survey
presenting papers incorporating this methodology in their IDS design is shown below.
One of the earliest IDS used in MANET, is the work of Huang and Lee [3], where they
proposed a distributed IDS architecture to cope with the dynamic nature of MANETs and anomalybased paradigm for detection. They developed a novel technique based on cross feature analysis
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(CFA) and applied the classification decision-tree induction algorithm to detecting” normal”
versus” abnormal” behavior. Detection rates of 83% at node mobility (15m/s) are presented.
Deng et al. [4] proposed an IDS based on SVM classification algorithm for two types of
IDS architecture distributed and hierarchal. Detection rates well above 90% were achieved with
using biasing in the feature selection.
Sun et al. [5] proposed a zone-based IDS using an alert aggregation algorithm. The network
is divided into non-overlapping zones and each IDS agent broadcasts locally generated alerts inside
the zone. Vector quantization technique is used for the preprocessing stage which is used to
construct a Markov chain model in the next stage. The Markov chain model is then turned into a
classifier, which serves as the detection algorithm. Detection rates vs pause time are presented, the
higher the pause time the better the detection rate which varies between 60% to 100% for pause
time between 0-600sec.
An ensemble-based IDS for MANETs was proposed by Cabrera [6, 7], where three-level
hierarchical system for data collection, processing and transmission was described. Anomaly index
at each level is calculated and the final decision is performed at the highest hierarchy. The authors
used the receiver operating characteristics ROC curves and the corresponding area under curve
(AUC) to characterize the performance of their proposed scheme. A C4.5 decision trees in
conjunction with the CFA algorithm was used for detection purposes.
Subramaniam et al [8] proposed a framework for wireless sensor networks having a
hierarchical topology that computes an approximate multidimensional data distribution in a
distributed fashion. They propose the Multi Granularity Deviation Factor (MDEF) metric. A value
is flagged as an outlier, if its MDEF is statistically significantly different from that of the local
averages.
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A Dynamic Learning method to detect black hole attacks on AODV based MANETs is
proposed by Kurosawa et al. [9]. A dynamic training method in which the training data is updated
at regular time intervals serves as the main concept for detecting malicious activity in the network.
A simple clustering algorithm is used to identify the malicious nodes. Detection rates vs. node
mobility are used for performance characterization, ranging from 70% to 84% for node mobility
between 0m/s and 20m/s.
In the proposed scheme by Bose et al. [10], a Bayesian classification algorithm, Markov
chain construction algorithm and association rule mining algorithm for anomaly detection in MAC,
routing and application layer respectively for effective intrusion detection has been deployed.
Detection rates of 94.33% and 0.8% false positive rate (FPR) were achieved at the global
integration module.
An IDS based on neural networks and watermarking techniques was presented by
Mitrokotsa and Komninos [11]. Detection rates around 90% with high false alarms (more than
20%) are reported. The detection rates were showed to be higher for longer periods of pause times.
Intrusion detection for wireless sensor networks based on multi agent

and

refined

clustering was proposed by Huai-Bin et al. [12]. It is based on two stage clustering where the first
stage uses SOM and in the second stage, a k-means algorithm is used to refine the clusters
generated in the first stage. Detection rates for three attacks: Port sweep, Smurf, and Nmap are
presented. Detection rates for Port sweep attacks varied between 60%-80%, for the Smurf attack
results ranged from 60%-90%, and for the Nmap attack the detection rates varied between 80%98%. All detection rates are plotted vs false alarm rates that have a maximum value of 0.2.
Mitrokotsa et al. [13] analyzed the performance of well-known five supervised
classification algorithms (the Naïve Bayes model, the linear model, the Gaussian mixture model,
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multilayer perceptron, and (SVM) model) used as detection technique in detection engines for
MANETs. Their results showed that the Naïve Bayes classifier has the poorest performance while
the best performance is achieved with the multilayer perceptron classifier.
A hybrid Approach for detecting the anomalous behavior of the network’s traffic using
Data Mining Techniques is proposed by Agarwal and Mittal [14]. The scheme combines both
entropy of network features and support vector machines. Correctly classified results for the
Hybrid model reached up to 97.25% compared to the individual methods (entropy and SVM)
which are 85.71% and 77.71% respectively.
Sumit et al. [15] proposed a scheme derived from the conventional k-mean clustering
algorithm called “effective k-means clustering”. The experiments were conducted in MANET
environment using the ZRP routing protocol.
A Two-tier Classification Model for Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection in IoT Backbone
Networks was presented by Pajouh et al. [16]. A two-tier classification module employing Naïve
Bayes and Certainty Factor version of K-Nearest Neighbor is deployed to detect malicious
activities. NSL-KDD dataset is used to carry out the classification process where detection rates
of 84.86% and false alarm rates of 4.86% are reported.
2.2.2 Signature-based IDS
In Signature-based (misuse-based or knowledge-based), profiles from previously known
attacks are generated and used to detect future attacks. Different rules are described in [2], which
helps defining the type of malicious activity. A major advantage is that it performs well with
previously known attacks but fails to do so with unknown attacks. A brief listing of papers which
adopted this technique are presented below.
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Vgina et. al. [17] used the concepts of STAT (state transition analysis) to design an
intrusion detection tool, AODVSTAT, to detect packet dropping and spoofing attacks in MANETs.
Signatures are represented by using an event model. Detection rates are close to 97% and FPRs of
3% were reported under controlled mobility conditions.
Little and Ko [18] presented an approach to detect coordinated attacks in tactical wireless
networks in where signatures from audit events generated at different locations are matched using
distributed detectors. Their approach decomposes an extended infinite state machine, an
operational representation of an attack signature, into multiple cooperative finite state machines
that enable distributed signature engines to match the signature.
Monitoring power consumption in every node’s battery is used in a scheme proposed by
Jacoby and Davis [19]. A set of power consumption patterns induced by known attacks is used for
detection by comparing a node’s power consumption using smart battery technology. High
detection rates of 99% for the proposed IDS were reported.
Hidoussi et. al. [20] proposed a centralized IDS based on misuse detection. It is designed
to detect black hole and selective forwarding attacks in clustered WSNs. Number of intruding
nodes vs simulation time is used to characterize the detection rate of their system. In the case of
black hole attack, all the intruding nodes were detected after 300sec. With selective forwarding, it
took 500 sec to detect all the malicious nodes.
2.2.3 Specification-based IDS
In specification-based IDS, a set of constraints are defined which describe the correct
operation of a protocol. The execution of the protocol is then compared to those constraints. This
technique has the advantages of both anomaly and signature-based IDS with a major drawback

8

being the high development time. Some of the work presented in the literature which implements
this technique are presented below.
One of the earliest works regarding specification-based IDS in MANET is the proposed
scheme by Tseng et al. [21]. Their approach requires detailed state information to be kept for each
flow by the IDS. Performance results regarding detection results are not provided.
A specification-based intrusion detection mechanism was proposed by Panos et al. [22]. It
is designed to detect DoS, black hole, session hijacking, and SYN flooding attacks. A set of selfcontained random walk detectors (RWD) and specification based multilayer detection engines are
used in this scheme. The authors developed a new scheme [23] based on their work presented in
[22] by proposing a host-based monitoring mechanism called SIDE. Detection rates are close to
100% for node velocities ranging from 0- 20 m/s. one of the major drawbacks in this scheme is
computational complexity due to involvement of cryptography based remote attestation procedure.
A fuzzy logic-based IDS was proposed by Singh [24] which utilizes the promiscuous mode
on each node which forward the collected data to the fuzzy system. A fidelity level to each node
is calculated marking the node as malicious if the fidelity level is less than certain threshold. The
authors reported 91% detection rates and 7% false positive alarms for 30 nodes in the network.
Le et al. [25] proposed a specification-based IDS to detect RPL topological attacks. The
network is divided into clusters with similar number of nodes. A cluster head collects data from
neighboring members and builds a state machine. TPRs and FPRs are used to characterize the
detection performance. TPRs of 86%-100% and FPR of 0.7%- 7% were reported.
2.2.4 Hybrid-based IDS
This detection scheme incorporates a mixture of the previously mentioned detection
methodologies. A few works are listed below.
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Mishra et al. [26] proposed a detection scheme that deploys the concept of adjustable
threshold values to reduce the false positive rates where both anomaly and signature-based
schemes are used. The authors claim that their system can detect a priori known attack patterns
with over 90% accuracy.
An Integrated Cross Layer approach for Detecting Routing Attacks in MANETs scheme,
(CRADS), was propped by JFC Joseph et al. [27] using SVMs. The proposed scheme uses both
anomaly and signature-based detection schemes. A major issue discussed in this paper, was
presenting complexity analysis for using SVM in MANETs environment. It shows the high cost
of using such classification algorithm. Detection efficiencies for different attacks were presented
varying between 80%-97% at different node’s mobility.
Nadeem and Howarth [28] proposed an adaptive response mechanism (IDAR) IDS which
utilizes both anomaly and signature-based detection techniques. Detection rates for rushing attack
ranges from 80%-95% for node velocity of 1m/s and 80% for node velocity of 15m/s. for Black
hole attack the detection rates range from 83%-95% for node velocity of 1m/s and 80% for node
velocity of 15m/s. Those results are related to 25 nodes in 500m2 area.
Alaparthy et al [29] gives an illustration of various immune inspired techniques and their
adaptability to network security. It gives an overview of three major techniques namely, negative
selection, danger theory, and clonal selection [30].
Alaparthy and Morgera designed an IDS based on an immune concept called danger theory
[31]. This algorithm uses both signature and anomaly-based techniques to develop an Artificial
Immune System (AIS) [32]. This detection scheme can detect various attacks such as blackhole,
selective forwarding, wormhole and DDoS attacks with a detection rate of 96%,85%,95% and 97%
respectively.
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CHAPTER 3:
MANETs
3.1 Introduction
The Mobile AdHoc Network (MANET) is a type of wireless network that doesn’t require
infrastructure for its operation. This feature makes it very appealing for rapid deployment in harsh
and challenging environments. There are many applications for these highly versatile networks.
The most important applications of MANETS are in support of military special operations and
civil emergency deployments.
3.2 Mobility Models
Different mobility models for Mobile AdHoc Networks are described in literature. These
mobility models are divided, according to [33], into the following areas:
•

Individual mobility models.

•

Group mobility models.

•

Autoregressive mobility models.

•

Time-variant community mobility models.

•

Knowledge-driven mobility models.

•

Flocking and swarm mobility models.

•

Non-recurrent mobility models.

•

Virtual game-driven mobility models.
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In this dissertation, the random way point mobility (RWP) model, which is widely adopted
model that falls under the individual mobility model’s category, the Reference Point Group
Mobility (RPGM), and finally the Gauss-Markov mobility model will be discussed.
3.2.1 Random Waypoint Mobility
The Random Waypoint Model (RWP) was first proposed by Broch et al. [34]. According
to [35], this model is a 'benchmark' mobility model to evaluate the MANET routing protocols due
to its simplicity and availability. The RWP model is by far the most widely used mobility model
in next generation wireless network simulation [36], and it is provided as a default mobility in
many network simulators. In the simulation, each node randomly selects one location as the
destination. It then travels towards this destination with constant velocity following a uniform
random variable from [0, Vmax], where the parameter Vmax is the maximum permissible velocity for
every mobile node. Each node choses the velocity and direction of movement autonomously from
other nodes in the simulation area. Once the node reaches its destination, it picks another direction
and moves towards it. A pause time can be introduced in the simulation which makes the node
stops for a period called pause time (Tpause).

Figure 3.1 Example of node movement in the Random Waypoint Model.
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The probability distribution of transition length for a rectangular area of length a and width
b. The probability density function of transition length L4 is [37]
𝑓𝐿 (𝑙) =

4𝑙
𝑓 (𝑙)
𝑎2 𝑏 2 0

(3.1)

with
𝜋
1
𝑎𝑏 − 𝑎𝑙 − 𝑏𝑙 + 𝑙 2
𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑏
2
2
𝑏
1
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑛−1 + 𝑎√𝑙 2 − 𝑏 2 − 𝑏 2 − 𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏 < 𝑙 < 𝑎
𝑙
2
𝑓0 (𝑙) =
𝑏
1
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑛−1 + 𝑎 √𝑙 2 − 𝑏 2 − 𝑏 2 − 𝑎𝑙
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ √𝑎2 + 𝑏 2
𝑙
2
𝑎
1
1
−𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑠 −1 + 𝑏√𝑙 2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑙 2
𝑙
2
2
{
}
0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(3.2)

Similarly, the expected value of transition length L is

𝐸(𝐿) =

1 𝑎3 𝑏 3
𝑎2 𝑏 2
[ 2 + 2 + √𝑎2 + 𝑏 2 (3 − 2 − 2 )] +
15 𝑏
𝑎
𝑏
𝑎

1 𝑏2
√𝑎2 + 𝑏 2 𝑎2
√𝑎2 + 𝑏 2
[ 𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ−1
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ−1
]
6 𝑎
𝑏
𝑏
𝑎

(3.3)

and the variance of transition length L is
1
𝐸[𝐿2 ] = (𝑎2 + 𝑏 2 )
6
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(3.4)

3.2.2 Reference Point Group Mobility
In this model, the nodes are divided into groups where each group has a leader. The
leader’s mobility follows random way point and the members of the group follow the leader’s
⃗⃗⃗⃗𝑖𝑡 , can
mobility closely, with some deviation [38]. The motion vector of group member i at time t, 𝑉
be written as
𝑡
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗
⃗⃗⃗⃗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗𝑡
𝑉
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 + 𝑅𝑀𝑖

(3.5)

where the motion vector⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 , is a random vector deviated by group member i from its own
𝑡
reference point. The motion vector of group leader ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗
𝑉𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
it is also the motion vector for the whole

group.
The vector ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is an independent identically distributed (i.i.d) random process whose
length is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 ] (where 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 is maximum allowed distance
deviation) and whose direction is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,2π).
A modified version of RPGM was proposed by [39]. The movement can be characterized
as follows:
|𝑉𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (𝑡)| = |𝑉𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (𝑡)| + 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚( ) . 𝑆𝐷𝑅. V𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (𝑡) = 𝜃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 (𝑡) + 𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑑𝑜𝑛( ) . 𝐴𝐷𝑅. 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥

(3.6)
(3.7)

where 0 < SDR, ADR < 1. SDR is the Speed Deviation Ratio and ADR is the Angle Deviation
Ratio. SDR and ADR are used to control the deviation of the velocity (magnitude and direction)
of group members from that of the leader.
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3.2.3 Gauss-Markov Mobility
This model was presented by Liang and Hass [40] where node velocity v(t) is correlated in
time and modeled using gauss-Markov random process. The stationary gaussian process v(t) is a
Gauss-Markov process if it has the auto correlation function
𝑅𝑣 (𝜏) = 𝐸[𝑣(𝑡)𝑣(𝑡 + 𝜏)] = 𝜎 2 𝑒 −𝛽|𝜏| + 𝜇 2

(3.8)

where σ2 is the variance of v(t), μ is its mean, and β ≥ 0 determines the degree of memory. A
discrete form of the velocity can be written as vn = v(nΔt) and memory level α = 𝑒 −𝛽𝑡 is shown in
equation 3.9
𝑣𝑛 = 𝛼𝑣𝑛−1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇 + 𝜎 (√1 − 𝛼 2 ) 𝑤𝑛−1

(3.9)

where wn is an uncorrelated Gaussian process with zero mean and unit variance and is independent
of vn. It has two components, magnitude and direction as shown in equation 3.10 and equation
3.11 respectively.
|𝑣𝑛 | = 𝛼|𝑣𝑛−1 | + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇|𝑣| + 𝜎|𝑣| (√1 − 𝛼 2 ) 𝑤|𝑣𝑛−1 |
𝜃𝑛 = 𝛼𝜃𝑛−1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝜃 + 𝜎𝜃 (√1 − 𝛼 2 ) 𝑤𝜃𝑛−1

(3.10)
(3.11)

At each time interval, the next location of the mobile node can be calculated based on the current
location, direction of movement, and speed using equations 3.12, 3.13
𝑥𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛−1 + |𝑣𝑛−1 |𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑛−1

(3.12)

𝑦𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛−1 + |𝑣𝑛−1 |𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑛−1

(3.13)

where (𝑥𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛 ) and (𝑥𝑛−1 , 𝑦𝑛−1 ) are the x and y-coordinates of the mobile node’s position at the
nth and (n−1)st time intervals, respectively, and |vn−1| and θn−1 are the speed and direction of the
mobile node, respectively, at the (n−1)st time interval.
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3.3 Routing Protocols
Routing protocols in MANETs face challenges due to the dynamic nature of the network.
There are three main categories into which routing protocols fall. These are described in detail in
this section.
3.3.1 Proactive Routing Protocols
These types of protocols, also called a table-driven protocol, attempt to maintain constant,
up-to-date routing information between every pair of nodes in the network by proactively
propagating route updates at fixed time intervals. The main routing protocols that fall under this
category are: Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) protocol [41], Optimized Link
State Routing (OLSR) Protocol[42], Cluster head Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) protocol[43],
Wireless Routing (WRP) Protocol[44], Global State Routing (GSR) Protocol[45], Fisheye State
Routing (FSR) Protocol[46], Hierarchical State Routing (HSR) Protocol[47], and Landmark
Routing (LANMAR) Protocol[48].
In these types of routing protocols, each node maintains routing information to every other
node (or nodes located in a specific part) in the network by proactively propagating route updates
at fixed time intervals [49]. The routing information are kept at different tables where they get
updated periodically. Different protocols in this category update the table’s data differently, and
the number of routing tables may differ from one routing protocol to another.
3.3.2 Reactive Routing Protocols
Reactive routing protocols perform the discovery process between two nodes only when
needed, therefore the packet traffic and packet header size are reduced in this case. There are
different types of reactive routing protocols such as dynamic source routing (DSR) Protocol [50],
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [51], signal stability routing (SSR) protocol
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[52], Associatively Based Routing (ABR) protocol [53], and Temporally Ordered Routing
Algorithm (TORA) protocol [54]. However, these types of protocols face a problem of latency
compared to proactive protocols. A well adopted protocol in this category is AODV, which uses
the expanding ring search algorithm, where the source node searches successively larger areas
until the destination node is found. It significantly reduces the flooding process especially when
having a large network.
There are three main types of packets that control the communication process in AODV:
•

Route-Request (RREQ) messages are used to initiate the route-finding process.

•

Route-Reply (RREP) messages are used to respond to the route requests.

•

Route-Error (RERR) messages are used to notify the network of a link breakage in an active
route.

The routing table fields used by AODV are:
•

Destination IP Address

•

Destination Sequence Number

•

Valid Destination Sequence number flag

•

Other state and routing flags

•

Network Interface

•

Hop Count

•

Next Hop

•

List of Precursors

•

Lifetime

A simplified scenario of communication between source A and distention F is shown in figure 3.2.
The source (A) initiates a RREQ which is broadcasted to the neighboring nodes. If an intermediate
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node has a route to the destination node, it will unicast a RREP packet back to the source. Upon
receiving the RREP, the source node will begin transmitting the data via a route that was
established during this route discovery process. It is important to mention the RREQ has a field
called the sequence number which determines the freshness of the route, hence being more
appealing to send data through it.

Figure 3.2 Route discovery in AODV.
When there is a link disconnection between the node closest to the destination node, a
RERR packet is initiated by that node and sent to the source node to indicate the destination node
is no longer reachable and to reestablish a link path discovery as shown in figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 Link maintenance in AODV.
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3.3.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols
These types of routing protocols use both reactive and proactive schemes to fulfil its
mission. The goal of such protocols is to exploit the better of the two worlds, the proactive
protocols and their low latency, and the reactive protocols and their low overheads. The
deployment area is divided into zones where the routing within each zone is performed proactively
and reactive if data needed to be routed outside each zone. One of the major protocols in this
category, is the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [55]. The nodes of a zone are divided into peripheral
nodes and interior nodes. If the radius of the routing zone is k, each node in the zone can be reached
within k hops from a source node (node 1). The minimum distance of a peripheral node from node
1 is k (the radius). All nodes shown in figure 3.4 are within the routing zone of node 1 except node
12. The routing zone has a radius equal to 2 hops. Nodes 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are called peripheral
nodes while nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are called interior nodes. In this routing zone the routing is
performed reactively, hence hello messages which are control packets used to maintain neighbors’
relationships in the network are exchanged periodically. The routing in the ZRP is divided into
two parts:
•

Intrazone Routing Protocol (IARP): this is the first step, where the packet is sent within the
routing zone of the source node to reach the peripheral nodes. In this zone, each node
maintains a routing table for its routing zone

•

Interzone Routing Protocol (IERP): at this stage the packet is sent from the peripheral
nodes towards the destination node. The process begins when the source node checks
whether the destination is within its zone. If so, the path to the destination is known, and
no further route discovery processing is required, otherwise, the source node broadcasts
RREQ to all its peripheral nodes. Now, in turn, all the peripheral nodes execute the same
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algorithm: they check whether the destination is within their zone. If so, a route reply
(referred to as reply) is sent back to the source indicating the route to the destination. If
not, the peripheral node forwards the query to its peripheral nodes, which in turn execute
the same procedure.

Figure 3.4 ZRP routing protocol example.
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CHAPTER 4:
TYPES OF ATTACKS IN MANET
4.1 Introduction
Malicious activities affect the performance of MANETs, and they prevent it from achieving
the goal of delivering data from source to destination with the most optimum fashion (least possible
delays, packet loss, power consumption etc.). Certain attacks affect different layers in the protocol
stack. Denial of service attack is one of the most common attacks that falls under this category. In
this chapter, attacks affecting the first layers in the protocol stack will be discussed.
4.2 Physical Layer Attacks
The physical layer is concerned with transmitting raw bits over a communication channel
[56]. The most common attack in this layer is conducted through an adversary which tampers a
mobile node physically. Electronically tampering of mobile nodes is widely conducted. The most
common attack in this layer, is the DoS which is performed by jamming process. In jamming, the
malicious node tries to disrupt the operation of the network by broadcasting a high-energy signal
[57]. This process affects the normal operation of the network leading to failure in data delivery.
4.3 Data Link Layer Attacks
This layer is responsible of organizing the access for different nodes to the medium. A
malicious node can take advantage of the back off mechanism and send data in continuous manner.
Manipulating the Request to Send (RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS) packets which control
the process of accessing the medium for different communicating devices is a common malicious
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activity in this layer. It can be conducted by forging fake RTS/CTS packets with large amount of
for extended periods would result in unfair access to the medium [58].
4.4 Network Layer Attacks
This layer is responsible for routing the packets from sources to destination. AODV routing
protocol will be used as a platform when discussing certain malicious activities such as blackhole
and flooding since it is used in the experiments discussed throughout the dissertation.
4.4.1 Blackhole
In this section the Black hole attack is described specifically when it is deployed under
AODV routing protocol, for this it is important to describe the mechanism of how the AODV
works. There are three main control packets that facilitate communication between nodes using
AODV. These control packets are: 1) Route Request (RREQ). 2) Route Reply (RREP). 3) Route
Error RERR. When a node wants to send data to another node in the network, it sends a RREQ
packet which will be broadcasted to all the nodes in vicinity to the sender, if an intermediate node
has a route to the destination node, it will unicast a RREQ packet back to the source. Upon
receiving the RREP, the source node will begin transmitting the data via a route that was
established during this route discovery process. It is important to mention that the RREQ has a
field called the sequence number which determines the freshness of the route, hence being more
appealing to send data through it. This is one of the major back doors that the Black hole (BH)
uses to falsify info which causes data diversion in the improper path (s) [59]. A simple model for
BH attack is shown in figure 4.1 where we can see that the malicious node located on the upper
path sends the RREP back to the source node (S) that is having a fake information promoting him
as the node having the shortest path to the Destination node (D).
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Figure 4.1 Black hole attack in AODV.
Upon receiving this fake information, the source will begin sending data to the malicious node
which in turn can drop the packets or perform other malicious activities.
4.4.2 Flooding
It is a DoS type of malicious activity which causes a major disruption of network
functionalities. In this dissertation the RREQ flooding attack, is used to simulate flooding activity
[60]. It is achieved by sending large volume of traffic through the network which might lead to
exhausting the network resources, overall bandwidth and individual node resources.
4.4.3 Selective Forwarding
A malicious node would act as a filter by forwarding certain types of packets and dropping
other or avoid certain packets to certain nodes [61].
4.4.4 Wormhole
A pair of colluding attackers record packets at one location and replay them at another
location using a private high-speed network [62].
4.4.5 Link Spoofing
A malicious node advertises fake links with non-neighbors to interrupt routing operations
[63]. For example, in the OLSR protocol, an attacker can advertise a fake link with a target’s two-
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hop neighbors. This causes the target node to select the malicious node to be its MPR. Hence, can
manipulate the data or routing traffic.
4.4.6 Rushing
A malicious node sabotages the route discovery process and increases the possibility that
the hostile node is included in a given route. The rushing attack of the compromised node rapidly
forwards the RREQ messages to ensure early arrival than do those from other nodes [64].
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CHAPTER 5:
APPROACHES TOWARDS INTRUSION DETECTION IN MANET
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the tools used in the detection schemes presented in this dissertation are
presented in section 5.2. Two detection approached are presented in this chapter. The first approach
called Simple Scheme Cross Layer IDS is presented in section 5.3. The second approach called
cross layer base IDS for MANET and WSN is presented in section 5.4.
5.2 Tools Used in the Proposed IDS
In this section, the tools used in our proposed IDS are discussed. Two types of decision
trees: C4.5, and random forest were used in the proposed scheme in section 5.2. The same decision
trees were deployed along with linear regression for the scheme proposed in section 5.3.
5.2.1 Decision Trees
The decision trees are type of supervised learning algorithms that are mostly used
in classification problems. The simplicity and efficiency are considered the major attributes in the
decision trees which is very useful in the applications where the computational power resources
are scarce.

1

The content of this chapter has been published in [65], [66], and it is included in this dissertation
and it is copyright from the IEEE. Permission is included in Appendix B.
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Figure 5.1 Example of decision tree components.
A simplified diagram showing the main components of a decision tree (root node, decision
node, and terminal node) is presented in figure 5.1. The decision trees adopt top-down approach
in splitting the data samples in smaller subsets based on different decision criterion, which will be
discussed. The root node is considered the best predictor. The decision node is the attribute where
the highest splitting criterion (information gain for example) is achieved. At terminal node or leaf
node the splitting process halts, it represents a decision. In this case a splitting criterion such as the
information gain is equal to zero.
5.2.1.1 C 4.5 Decision Trees
Presented by Quinlan [67]. It uses the information gain as its splitting criterion and supports
pruning. The information gain is a splitting technique based on the entropy reduction. It calculates
the entropy of the parent node minus the average entropy of the children nodes. The information
gain is defined as
𝑛

𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 (𝑝) − (∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑖) )
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(5.1)

where a parent node is split into k partitions, and ni is the number of instances in partition i. The
entropy is defined as:
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 = − ∑𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝𝑖

(5.2)

were 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of class i
5.2.1.2 Random Forest
Another type of decision tree discussed in this section is an ensemble-based decision trees
called random forest [68]. Random forest uses a technique called bootstrap aggregation (Bagging)
which samples the data set used in the classification task, randomly with replacement.

Figure 5.2 Example of random forest using bootstrap resampling.
A random forest consists of multiple decision trees called stumps (as shown in figure 5.2
in the learning machine block), which is considered the simplest form of decision trees, its depth
equals to one. The bootstrap method is a resampling technique to generate slightly different data
sets from the original training data set, and bagging combines many classifiers trained with slightly
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different data sets. Since slightly different data sets give slightly different classifiers, averaging
them is expected to give a more durable classifier.
5.2.2 Linear Regression
Regression is a statistical technique used to find and model the relation between variables
[69]. The observations plotted in figure 5.3, the fatal traffic accidents per state vs the state
population, can be modeled generally but not exactly as a straight line. This graph is called the
scatter diagram. If we let y represent fatal traffic accidents per state and x represent population of
state, then the equation of a straight line relating these two variables is
(5.3)

𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥

where 𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝛽1 is the slope. Apparently, not all points fulfil the straight line
equation, therefore a more general equation that takes in consideration those points will be needed.
Adding a random variable called the error 𝜀 would make the model more realistic as shown
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥 + 𝜀

(5.4)

The model shown in equation 5.4 is called linear regression model. Assume the errors are
normally distributed 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ).

A method of least squares is used to estimate 𝛽0 and 𝛽1, that is the sum of the squares of
the differences between the observations 𝑦𝑖 and the straight line is a minimum. least - squares
criterion is given as
𝑛

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑅𝑆𝑆) = ∑(𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖 )2
𝑖=1
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(5.5)

Figure 5.3 Example of simple linear regression.
̂
The least - squares estimators of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 , say 𝛽̂
0 and 𝛽1 , must satisfy
𝑛

𝜕(𝑅𝑆𝑆)
̂
|
= −2 ∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽̂
0 − 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖 ) = 0
𝜕𝛽0 𝛽̂ ,𝛽̂
0

1

(5.6)

𝑖=1

and
𝑛

𝜕(𝑅𝑆𝑆)
̂
|
= −2 ∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽̂
0 − 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖 )𝑥𝑖 = 0
𝜕𝛽1 𝛽̂ ,𝛽̂
0

1

(5.7)

𝑖=1

The solution to these equations yields the least squares regression estimates
𝛽̂
̅ − 𝛽1 𝑥̅
0 =𝑦
̂1 =
𝛽

(5.8)

∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦̅)(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥̅ )
∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥̅ )2

where 𝑦̅ and 𝑥̅ denote the mean of y and x, respectively.

29

(5.9)

5.2.3 Detection Characterization
The main parameters used to characterize the detection performance of the system
presented in section 5.4 are True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), False Positive
Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and Detection Rate (DR).
The true positives (TP) and true negatives (TN) are correct classifications. A false positive
(FP) occurs when the outcome is incorrectly predicted as positive while it is a negative. A false
negative (FN) occurs when the outcome is incorrectly predicted as negative when it is actually
positive. The overall detection rate (Accuracy), is the number of correct classifications divided by
the total number of classifications [70].
𝐷𝑅 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(5.10)

The true positive rate is TP divided by the total number of positives, and the false positive
rate is FP divided by the total number of negatives. These terms are presented in equation 5.11 to
equation 5.14.
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(5.11)

𝑇𝑁𝑅 =

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

(5.11)

𝐹𝑃𝑅 =

𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁

(5.13)

𝐹𝑁𝑅 =

𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃

(5.14)
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5.3 Simple Scheme Cross Layer IDS
5.3.1 Introduction
In this section, a proposed scheme which divides the field of operation into smaller squares
and in each square an imaginary circle lies in its center is presented. As soon as a node moves
inside the circle, it switches to promiscuous mode; then, the node acts as a pseudo cluster head
(PCH) collecting data from its neighboring nodes in each quadrant in the field and then uses this
information to calculate an anomaly index (AI) in each quadrant. The calculated AI will be passed
to the Manager which acts as a command and control unit and computes a network-level AI.
5.3.2 System Model/Architecture
We propose a scheme where the field of operation is divided into smaller squares and in
each square an imaginary circle lies in its center. As soon as a node moves inside the circle, it
switches to promiscuous mode (ability to sniff all packets transmitted by nodes within radio range)
acting as PCH. Figure 5.4 shows a snapshot of the network deployment that was generated using
the NetAnim tool in NS3. The radius of each circle is 50m and its center is located at the center
of the hypotenuse in each quadrant as shown in Figure 5.4 where is shows a snapshot of three
PCHs (Nodes 4, 16, and 28). The data collected by PCH will help generating an anomaly index
for each quadrant. The calculated AI will be passed to the Manager shown in the middle of the
grid, it acts as a command and control unit, it also gives a network level AI. The PCH changes as
time progresses, while the Manager is a permanent position.
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Figure 5.4 A proposed scheme for distributed IDS using PCH.
5.3.3 Experimental Settings
The discrete event network simulator NS3 [71] was used to mimic the network behavior.
The main parameters of the experiment are summarized in table 5.1.
The simulation process is described in Algorithm 1 Initially, the nodes are deployed in the
grid following a uniform distribution. Then, we set k circular promiscuous zones with radius r.
The anomalous network profile is created by stetting node 30 as a black blackhole and running the
simulation for 2000 seconds for 10 different time (seeds). In addition, the mobile nodes, namely
all the nodes use the Random Way Point mobility (RWP) model.
The nodes will be set to normal state when traveling out of promiscuity zones, and
promiscuous when get inside them. Once in promiscuous state, the node starts to sniff the
neighbors in its radio range and computes the intrusion threshold. This value is then forward to the
manager node. Sampling time of 10 seconds is used obtain the counts of a set of features that
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characterize the behavior of the nodes in the previously described process. The training period was
2000 seconds and the number of seeds is ten seeds in each case (Normal, Malicious). A profile for
each of the previously mentioned features was generated and averaged over the number of seeds
in each case. The Cluster Head captures the following features upon entering the promiscuous
area. We use the following set of features as shown in table 5.2.
Table 5.1 Simulation parameters used in the experiment.
No of Nodes

30

Mobility model

Random Waypoint

MAC protocol

802.11b

Routing protocol

AODV

Data type

UDP

Node velocity

5m/sec

Field area

1000mx1000m

Range

250m

Table 5.2 Cross layer features used in the experiment.
Mac layer
Network layer

Tx/Rx
RTS
Tx/Rx
RREQ

Tx/Rx
CTS
Tx/Rx
RREP
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Tx/Rx
ACK
Tx/Rx
RERR

Algorithm 1 Proposed PCH Algorithm.
1: Nodes deployment − uniform distribution
2: Set k promiscuous zones with radius r
3: Set node 30 as blackhole
4: start nodes −mobility following mobility model
5: repeat
6:

if node in promiscuous zone then

7:

sniff neighbors

8:

Compute detection − AI

9:

Transmit detection − AI to Manager

10: end if
11: continue in normal state
12: until End of simulation

Although no feature selection mechanism was adopted in this experiment, the three most
effective features noticed based on the difference between packet counts of the normal and
malicious states are shown in figure 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.

Figure 5.5 Number of transmitted ACKs in both malicious (ACKT M) and normal cases
(ACKT N).
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Figure 5.6 Number of transmitted RREQs in both malicious (RREQT M) and normal cases
(RREQT N).

Figure 5.7 Number of transmitted RREPs in both malicious (RREPT M) and normal cases
(RREPT N).
5.3.4 Results and Discussion
The accuracy of the classifier was evaluated using a stratified ten-fold cross validation.
Ten-fold cross validation randomly splits the testing set into ten equally sized subsets. The folds
are stratified, which means each fold contains a proportional amount of each class. For each fold,
we train on the other nine folds and test on the current fold, and average together each fold
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classification accuracy for a total predicted accuracy. Table 5.3 shows the detailed accuracy per
class, and its last row presents the weight averaged over the two network states, namely normal
and malicious.
Table 5.3 Detailed accuracy by class.
Class

TPR

FPR

Normal

0.975

0.020

Malicious

0.980

0.025

Weighted average

0.977

0.023

5.3.5 Conclusion
In this section, a framework for intrusion detection for MANETs was proposed. The
framework considers a hierarchical architecture where the intrusion detection is distributed
through a set of promiscuous zones (PZ). Unlike the traditional approach where the nodes are
promiscuous all the time, in our scheme the nodes are promiscuous for the period that they are in
the PZ. Once a node leaves the virtual PZ its promiscuity is turned off in order to save energy. We
used a simple C4.5 decision tree to learn the network behavior under blackhole attack, and after
exhaustive evaluation, we found that our approach can recognize blackhole attacks with up to 97%
accuracy. The presented approach has twofold advantage: it is energy efficient and has a high
degree of intrusion detection with a low overhead. For future work, the mission is to devise a
scheme that dynamically controls the location of the PZs in such a way that always insures the
coverage of the detection process in the simulation.
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The detection results are based on data collected over large period (the whole simulation
period). A more realistic approach that uses smaller number of instances to make decisions on
periodical bases, is presented in the next work in section 5.4.
5.4 Cross Layered-based IDS for MANET
5.4.1 Introduction
The need for rapid deployment of IDS capability with minimal data availability for training
and testing is an important requirement of such systems, especially for MANETs deployed in
highly dynamic scenarios, such as battlefields. This work proposes a two-level detection scheme
for detecting malicious nodes in MANETs. The first level deploys dedicated sniffers working in
promiscuous mode. Each sniffer utilizes a decision tree-based classifier that generates quantities
which we refer to as correctly classified instances (CCIs) every reporting time. In the second level,
the CCIs are sent to an algorithmically run supernode that calculates quantities, which we refer to
as the accumulated measure of fluctuation (AMoF) of the received CCIs for each node under test
(NUT). A key concept that is used in this work is that the variability of the smaller size population
which represents the number of malicious nodes in the network is greater than the variance of the
larger size population which represents the number of normal nodes in the network. A linear
regression process is then performed in parallel with the calculation of the AMoF for fitting
purposes and to set a proper threshold based on the slope of the fitted lines. As a result, the
malicious nodes are efficiently and effectively separated from the normal nodes. The proposed
scheme is tested for various node velocities and power levels and shows promising detection
performance even at low-power levels. The results presented also apply to wireless sensor
networks (WSN) and represent a novel IDS scheme for such networks.
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5.4.2 Mathematical Modeling of the CCIs
An analytical form of the AMoF is desired, in order to establish a proper detection threshold
to distinguish between two classes, malicious and normal nodes. To obtain such a form, extensive
work was conducted to obtain best distribution fitting of the accumulated CCIs, at the supernode,
which represents the main block of the AMoF modeling. The data is collected in a matrix form,
where the number of rows is equal to the number of reporting times N, and the number of columns
is equal to the number of sniffing sensors n.
The matrix is populated with the CCIs obtained at every Tr, as shown in Table 5.4. The
reporting time (Tr) is simply the simulation time divided by N, and is the time used to collect data
by the sniffers to generate a CCI which is then sent to the supernode. An example of Tr/Ts
calculation is shown in Section 5. The sample fitting was performed column-wise to show the best
distribution fit for each sniffing sensor. The log-likelihood ratio is employed to decide the closest
distribution to our data samples. The top three distributions that provided best fits were found to
be the extreme value (EV), gamma, and Nakagami distributions.

Correctly
Classified Instances
(CCIs) for every
repotting time Tr

Table 5.4 A sample table for the collected correctly classified instances (CCIs) at the super node
every Tr.
Sniffers
…………………….
𝑆1
𝑆𝑛
(𝑆 )
(𝑆1 )
𝐶𝐶𝐼1
𝐶𝐶𝐼1 𝑛
…………………….
.
.
…………………….

.
(𝑆 )

𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑁 1

…………………….

.
(𝑆 )

𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑁 𝑛

Algorithm 1 and the preceding paragraphs in Section 4, provide a detailed explanation and
calculation of the AMoF, which are based on subtracting the consecutive CCIs for each sensor,
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taking the average CCI of the n sniffing sensors and finally, adding to the calculated sample from
the previous iteration.
The extreme value distribution proved to be the best fitting distribution for a wide range of
reporting time/sampling time (Tr/Ts) ratios based on the log-likelihood value. Samples of fitted
distributions using a reporting time of Tr =100 s and a sampling time of Ts =10 s (for two extreme
cases of node mobility and power level) are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
The data fitting for the first scenario with node velocity 1 m/s and power level 3 dBm is
shown in Table 5.5. The other scenario is presented in Table 5.6, where the node velocity is 15
m/s and the power level is 7 dBm. Node 13, a normal node, and Node 19, a malicious node, are
used to illustrate the best fit for the CCIs. In tables 5.5 and 5.6, the node under test (NUT) is
indicated. The node speed and power levels are used to describe different scenarios in this work,
for example, a node speed of 1m/s and power level of 3 dBm is abbreviated as NS1P3.
Table 5.5 The log-likelihood for three different density fits in scenario NS1P3.
NS1P3, Tr = 100 s, Ts = 10 s
NUT: 13
NUT: 19
Log-likelihood for sensor Log-likelihood for sensor
5
5
EV
21.4374
EV
20.0272
Gamma
15.2119
Gamma
17.4694
Nakagami
16.0349
Nakagami
18.1008

39

a)
b)
Figure 5.8 Data fitting for the CCIs of sensor 5: a) Data fitting for three distributions, extreme
value EV, Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS1P3 for node under test (NUT) 13; b) Data
fitting for three distributions, EV, Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS1P3 for NUT 19.

The distribution fitting shown in Figure 5.8 shows that the EV distribution fits the CCIs
better than the Gamma and Nakagami distributions.
The distribution fitting shown in Figure 5.9 shows that EV distribution fits the CCIs better
than the gamma and Nakagami distributions. Gamma and Nakagami distribution fitting are very
close (Figures 5.8 and 5.9); this is expected considering the Nakagami distribution is a specific
type of gamma distribution.
Table 5.6 The log-likelihood for three different density fitting in scenario NS15P7.
NS15P7, Tr = 100 s, Ts = 10 s.
NUT: 13
NUT: 19
Log-likelihood for sensor 5 Log-likelihood for sensor 5
EV
14.4636
EV
32.4864
Gamma
13.1913
Gamma
31.0568
Nakagami
13.4487
Nakagami
31.2517
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a)
b)
Figure 5.9 Data fitting for the CCIs of sensor 5: a) Data fitting for three distributions, EV,
Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS1P3 for NUT 13; b) Data fitting for three distributions,
EV, Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS15P7 for NUT 19.
The last set of distribution fitting results is presented in Table 4 and Figure 4, for scenario
NS5P7, Tr = 25 s, and Ts = 5 s which has more fitting samples compared to the previous scenarios,
in this case 2000/25 = 80 sample.
Again, the EV distribution shows to be the best fit compared with gamma and Nakagami
distributions. All the results presented in this section are based on experimental setup described in
Section 5.3.4.
Table 5.7 The log-likelihood for three different density fitting in scenario NS5P7.
NS5P7, Tr = 25 s, Ts = 5 s
NUT: 13
NUT: 19
Log-likelihood for sensor 5 Log-likelihood for sensor 5
EV
43.8455
EV
61.8714
Gamma
33.0146
Gamma
55.1129
Nakagami
34.326
Nakagami
56.2025
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a)
b)
Figure 5.10 Data fitting for the CCIs of sensor 5: a) Data fitting for three distributions, EV,
Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS5P7 for NUT 13; b) Data fitting for three distributions,
EV, Gamma, and Nakagami in scenario NS5P7 for NUT 19.

As mentioned earlier, an analytical model for the AMoF proved to be challenging;
therefore, well-established heuristic methods were employed to develop a model and algorithm
that calculates the AMoF.
5.4.3 System Architecture
The system shown in Figure 5 consists of n dedicated sniffers, Si , i = 1,

, n . The packet

traces are collected from the MAC and network layers related to the NUTs. The packets collected
from the MAC layer are received and transmitted: request to send (RTS), clear to send (CTS), and
acknowledgment (ACK). The packets collected from the network layers are received and
transmitted: RREQ, RREP, and RERR. Both layers’ features are shown in Table 5.8.
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Figure 5.11 A two stage cross layer IDS.
The variability in the consecutive CCIs is a key feature used to distinguish between normal
and malicious nodes, where normal nodes have higher variability in consecutive CCIs. This idea
is based on the smaller size population (which represents the number of malicious nodes in the
network) vis-à-vis the larger-size population (which represents the number of normal nodes in the
network).
The first stage of detection is conducted at the sniffer level, where each sniffer is a classifier
and performs a local classification using a C4.5 decision tree or random forest. The outcome of
this process is a CCI every Tr seconds, which is sent to the supernode for further processing. The
simulation time is N×Tr, where the supernode performs the second stage of detection by applying
an iterative slope (β) and threshold (δ) calculation based on linear regression for each NUT as
shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Table 5.8 Cross layer features.
Mac layer
Network layer

Tx/Rx
RTS
Tx/Rx
RREQ

Tx/Rx
CTS
Tx/Rx
RREP
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Tx/Rx
ACK
Tx/Rx
RERR

Tx/Rx
Payload

The AMoF is calculated in Algorithm 1 by applying a sliding window of size 1 on an N×n
matrix, which is populated by the CCIs gathered about any NUT by the dedicated sniffers. This
process if performed by subtracting the consecutive CCIs for each sensor, taking the average CCI
of the n sniffing sensors, and finally adding the average of all the columns of the normalized
absolute differences within each column to the calculated sample from the previous iteration. The
variable 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 represents the subtraction of the consecutive CCIs, row-wise, where every
column represents a number of sniffers. The absolute value is taken at each iteration and then
divided by 100, which is the maximum possible difference between two consecutive CCIs. Finally,
the 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 is calculated by finding the accumulated mean of the sniffers' CCIs. The second
algorithm uses linear regression to iteratively find the fitted slope and confidence intervals
regarding the CCIs of each NUT. Note that is the number of instances received by the supernode,
is also the number of reporting times in the experiment.
Linear regression explains the dependency between the dependent variable X and
independent variable Y as [72],
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ,

(5.15)

where 𝛽0and 𝛽1are the model parameters. The errors 𝜖𝑖 are assumed to be independent 𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ).
The confidence interval for 𝛽1 is given as
𝑏1 ±
𝛼

𝛼
𝑡 (𝑛 − 2,1 − 2 ) 𝑠
{∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥´)2 }1⁄2

,

(5.16)

𝛼

where 𝑡 (𝑛 − 2,1 − 2 ) is the 100 (1 − 2 ) percentage point of a t-distribution with (𝑛 − 2) degrees
of freedom and the residual sum of squares 𝑠 2 . The confidence of the slope in equation 5.11 is C
as in Algorithm 2. Once enough AMoF samples have been generated (three samples suffice), the
iterative regression calculates the fitted slope 𝛽1, including its upper and lower bounds.
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Algorithm 1 Calculating the AMoF for malicious and normal nodes
1: Input: 𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑆𝑛)1,………, 𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑆𝑛) 𝑁 ,
2: Output: AMoF
3: At the super node
4: ∀𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 ∈ 𝑁𝑈𝑇
5: Receive𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑆𝑛)1 ,………, 𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑆𝑛) 𝑁 S.T 𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑁𝑈𝑇) 𝑖𝑠 𝑁 × 𝑛
6: Initialize 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) , Norm_𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 , 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑆𝑗 ) 𝑖
7: for i =1 to 𝑁 do
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

for j =1 to n do
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 ←|(𝐶𝐶𝐼(𝑆𝑗 ) 𝑖+1 − 𝐶𝐶𝐼 (𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 )| + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗 ) 𝑖−1
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 ←𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗) 𝑖 /100
end for
𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑆𝑗 ) 𝑖 ← (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝(𝑆𝑗 ) 𝑖 /𝑛) + 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑆𝑗) 𝑖−1

13: end for
The threshold is calculated first by finding an initial threshold (𝛿 ∗ )which is the difference
between the maximum of the upper bounds and the minimum of the upper bounds of all NUTs
divided by two and added to the minimum of the upper bounds for that iteration.
The permanent threshold (𝛿) value is adopted once a small number of consecutive initial
thresholds achieve the criterion |∆|. The normal nodes are those which have a higher upper bound
value than the permanent threshold. In other words, normal nodes maintain higher fluctuation in
the received CCIs compared to the malicious nodes.
5.4.4 Experimental Setup
In the network of 30 nodes, there exist five data sources transmitting data to five destination
nodes (sinks). All other nodes act as routers following an AODV protocol. In the experiment, UDP
(user datagram protocol) connection was used and data traffic of constant bit rate (CBR) was
applied between source nodes to destination nodes. The network used in this experiment has a data
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rate of 2Mb/s (802.11b) and assumes a Friis loss model [73]. Different power levels and node
velocities are studied in the paper as shown in table 5.9.
Algorithm 2 Calculating the fitted slope (𝛽) for every NUT, setting the detection threshold (𝛿)
1: Input: 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑁𝑈𝑇)1 ,………, 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑁𝑈𝑇) 𝑁−1
2: Output: fitted slope (𝛽), detection threshold (𝛿)
3: At the super node:
4: ∀𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 ∈ 𝑁𝑈𝑇 where the number of elements in NUT = l
5: Receive𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑁𝑈𝑇)1 ,.., 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑁𝑈𝑇) 𝑁−1 S.T 𝐴𝑀𝑜𝐹 (𝑁𝑈𝑇) is 𝑙 × (𝑁 − 1)
6: for k=1 to 𝑁 − 1 do
7:

for j =1 to NUT do

8:

If k ≥ 3 then

9:

Find 𝛽𝑘 by solving (1)

10:

Find 𝐶𝑘 by solving (2)

11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

Find initial threshold 𝛿𝑘∗ = (
∗
If 𝛿𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘−1
≤ |∆|
𝛿𝑘 ← 𝛿𝑘∗
If 𝛿𝑘 > 𝛿
node is normal
else
node is malicious

18:

𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐶𝑘 )−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐶𝑘 )
2

) + 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐶𝑘 )

end for

19: end for
The raw data were collected by simulating a network of thirty mobile nodes using the
widely adopted discrete-event network simulator NS-3. A node’s mobility follows the random way
point (RWP) mobility model. Five of the nodes are designated as dedicated sniffers that collect
data from the neighboring nodes promiscuously. They then generate CCIs, which in turn are sent
to the supernode that performs the AMoF algorithm that includes a linear regression of the MoF
so that it can detect the malicious nodes. The first level detection is at the sniffers’ level, where
each sniffer generates a CCI at each Tr. Simple, yet effective, machine-learning algorithms have
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been adopted; most notably, the C4.5 decision tree or random forest. A supervised learning
approach is adopted, which means simulations for both normal and malicious dataset retrieval are
needed.
The number of sniffers was chosen as a tradeoff between the following considerations:
1. The Area covered is 1000 m by 1000 m, which requires enough sniffers, especially when
having low connectivity scenarios, e.g., node speed = 15 m/s, and power level 3 dBm
(NS15P3).
2. The variability of data collected from a small number of sniffers will on average be higher
than collected by a larger number of sniffers.
For those reasons, the number of sniffers chosen was five, to provide effective area coverage,
moderate variability, and effective operation for up to three malicious nodes.
The first set of simulations was performed to obtain the behavior of the network under
normal conditions (no black holes or flooding deployed), by running the experiment for 2000 s
each time for twenty different seeds, to have a better statistical average, for every single scenario.
In the second set of simulations, a malicious condition was obtained by deploying three black holes
in the network and running the simulations as in the normal case for another twenty seeds for each
single scenario. The power levels, the node’s mobility, and other simulation parameters are listed
in Table 5.9.
The extreme case scenarios adopted in this paper are chosen such that they span a diversity
of node velocities and power levels. These scenarios are: NS1P3, NS1P7, NS15P3, and NS15P7.
The abbreviation NS1P3, for example, means node velocity 1m/s and power level of 3dBm. The
model of normal and malicious states is obtained at every reporting time and is used to train the
classifiers which, in turn, generate the CCIs.
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Table 5.9 Simulation parameters.
No. of Nodes
Field area

30
1000m × 1000m
1m/s, 5m/s, 10m/s
15m/s
2000 s
3dBm, 7dBm
802.11 b
AODV
RWP, GM
50 s, 100 s, 200 s
5 s, 10 s, 20 s, 40 s

Node speed
Simulation time
Power levels
MAC layer protocol
Routing protocol
Mobility model
Reporting time (Tr)
Sampling time (Ts)
Nodes Under Test
NUTs
Traffic source

13, 19, 21, and 23
CBR (UDP)

Different reporting times are used: 25 s, 50 s, 100 s, and 200 s, and within each reporting
time, different sampling times are used such as 5 s, 10 s, 20 s, and 40 s, depending on the length
of the reporting period. For example, if we have a reporting time of 50 s, the sampling time used
is 5 s, or 10 s. the ratio between Tr and Ts is chosen to have at least five instances in each class
(normal or malicious). A reporting time of 200 s and sampling time of 5 s will give 40 instances
for each class.
To avoid feature redundancy and for computational efficiency, a subset of the features is
selected using a correlation-based feature selection technique called a correlation attribute
evaluator, where the features are ranked according to their relative weights; the higher the weight,
the more influential is the feature on the decision process. The top six features were chosen in
every scenario for every NUT. The classifiers are validated using a ten-fold cross validation
process. This process divides the labeled data into ten equal folds and uses nine folds for training
and one-fold for testing. The process continues in a circular way, and resulting parameters are
averaged over ten. At each reporting time (Tr), the sniffers generate a set of TN, TP, FP, FN, which
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constitutes the confusion matrix. The CCI which is the sum of the TP and TN, showed via the
calculation of its variation in timely manner, to be a better measure for differentiating between
malicious and normal nodes. This is mainly due to the labeling of the data set that is based on
network behavior, by having all normal nodes for the normal labeling process, and three malicious
nodes when obtaining the malicious labeling. This approach was meant to give higher robustness
when having networks with different nodes functionalities or roles.
5.4.5 Results and Discussion
In this section, the detection results for two types of malicious activities: blackhole, and
flood attack each tested under two different mobility models, RWP, and GM. A set of figures
shown below presenting the AMoF and the fitted slope for each NUT in the experiment. The 1st
scenario is NS1P7 with two Tr/Ts options: 25/5, and 50/10. The 2nd scenario is NS15P3 with Tr/Ts
of 50/10 only. To minimize the caption size on tables and figures, an abbreviation is adopted. For
example, NS1P7_BH_RWP_255 means that the scenario is NS1P7 (node velocity 1 m/s, Power
transmitted 7 dBm, Blackhole as a malicious activity, random way point as mobility model, and
Tr = 25 sec, Ts = 5 sec. An example of obtaining the DR is by summing the lower bound points
for node (13, 23) which are above the threshold summing the upper bound points for node (19, 21)
which are below the threshold and then dividing this total by the total number of points. For
example, in the case of Tr = 25 s, we have 80 points with 79 AMoF points and 78 fitted slope
points. The total number of points mentioned above is 78×4 = 312 points. The number of NUT are
4. Similarly, the TPR, FPR, TNR, TPR were obtained using the description is section 5.2.3.
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a)

b)
Figure 5.12 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_FL_GM 25/5.
Table 5.10 Performance characterization for NS1P7_FL_GM 25/5.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.9808

0.9615

0

1

0.0385
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a)

b)
Figure 5.13 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_BH_GM 25/5.
Table 5.11 Performance characterization for NS1P7_BH_GM 25/5.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.952

0.91

0.0064

0.9936

0.0897
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a)

b)
Figure 5.14 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_FL_RWP 25/5.
Table 5.12 Performance characterization for NS1P7_FL_RWP 25/5.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.9551

0.9231

0.0128

0.9872

0.0769
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a)

b)
Figure 5.15 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_BH_RWP 25/5.

Table 5.13 Performance characterization for NS1P7_BH_RWP 25/5.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.96153

0.9295

0.0065

0.9935

0.0705
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a)

b)
Figure 5.16 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_FL_GM 50/10.
Table 5.14 Performance characterization for

NS1P7_FL_GM 50/10.

DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.9671

0.9342

0

1

0.0658
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a)

b)
Figure 5.17 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_BH_GM 50/10.
Table 5.15 Performance characterization for NS1P7_BH_GM 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.9605

0.9211

0

1

0.0789
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a)

b)
Figure 5.18 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_FL_RWP 50/10.
Table 5.16 Performance characterization for

NS1P7_FL_RWP 50/10.

DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.97368

0.9474

0

1

0.0526

56

a)

b)
Figure 5.19 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS1P7_BH_RWP 50/10.

Table 5.17 Performance characterization for NS1P7_BH_RWP 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.9539

0.9295

0.0065

0.9935

0.0705
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a)

b)
Figure 5.20 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS15P3_FL_GM 50/10.

Table 5.18 Performance characterization for NS15P3_FL_GM 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.90789

0.8552

0.03947

0.96052

0.1447
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a)

b)
Figure 5.21 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS15P3_BH_GM 50/10.

Table 5.19 Performance characterization for NS15P3_BH_GM 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.8487

0.8026

0.1053

0.8947

0.1974
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a)

b)
Figure 5.22 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS15P3_FL_RWP 50/10.

Table 5.20 Performance characterization for NS15P3_FL_RWP 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.8816

0.7895

0.0263

0.9737

0.2105
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a)

b)
Figure 5.23 Detection process for different NUT: a) AMoF, b) Fitted slope,
for NS15P3_BH_RWP 50/10.

Table 5.21 Performance characterization for NS15P3_BH_RWP 50/10.
DR

TPR

FPR

TNR

FNR

0.8355

0.7763

0.1053

0.8947

0.2237
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The results show a clear advantage when dealing with higher transmitted power as in
NS1P7 scenario with moderate node velocity of 1m/s. This allows the DS to collect better number
of packets which the core of the features used to facilitate the detection process. Detection rates
ranging from 95%- 98% with FPRs of 3%-9% are presented. It is noted that the detection rates for
flooding attacks are slightly better than those of Blackhole attacks which could be associated to
the nature of the black hole attack itself. This is because black hole in our simulations does not
drop packets only, it falsifies control packets to convince other nodes transmitting data through it.
In the case of flooding attack, the malicious node overflows the network by sending more RREQ
packets than the standardized limit of 10 RREQs /sec [74]. The rate adopted in this experiment is
50 RREQs/sec.
The results shown in the NS15P3 scenario are expected due to the extreme difficulty in
capturing enough packet counts which helps building accurate model for the classification process.
Also, the high node velocity aggravates the situation since it doesn’t help DS in locking on the
malicious or normal nodes for enough period. This leads to low detection rates and high FPRs as
shown in table 5.18 to table 5.21.
Finally, it is noted a slightly better detection performance when comparing GM mobility
model with RWP mobility model. This is related to the nature of the GM model adapted in this
experiment which has a value of alpha of 0.5 which leads to moderate degree of randomness
leading for better detection performance.
5.4.6 Conclusion
The use of the AMoF as a novel feature showed promising results especially for small size
datasets; this is inherent to MANET operation, particularly in demanding environments where
rapid decisions must be made. The inaccuracies of detection in stage one is compensated for in
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stage two, by taking advantage of the variability of the CCIs for normal and malicious nodes. The
idea is based on the variance of two distinct sizes of random variable populations, i.e., the normal
and malicious node populations, where the variance is higher for the larger normal node population
(in our case, 90% of the total nodes). This scheme, as all others we are aware of, will face higher
challenges when exposed to comparably sized populations. The results show that for low-node
velocity and high power transmitted, different ratios of reporting time to sampling time, Tr/Ts,
reveal well-separated regions that facilitate the detection process with detection rates above 95%
and false rate of 4% on average. This is related to a high-node connectivity. The scenario of highnode velocity and low-transmitted power, e.g., NS15P3, shows less detection capability, with
detection rates around 82% and high false alarms, around 15%. This is related to low node
connectivity.
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CHAPTER 6:
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, a machine learning based IDS on decision trees and PCH scheme is
introduced. Another scheme based on decision trees and linear regression is presented. It uses
small number of labeled instances for the detection process in a time varying fashion. Both
schemes would help building an IDS which is reliable and meets the stringent requirements in
MANET and WSN environment such as low power availability and the need for rapid deployment
of such systems. Both schemes utilize the promiscuous mode feature to collect first hand data
which avoids falsified data sent by a malicious node to a DS. Although, PCH scheme proved to
have considerable detection rate, it needs a large number of instances. However, this limitation can
be countered by using the cross layered detection scheme.
A trust-based IDS is our future focus since it allows building data base for nodes in the
network and based on the trust level, data collected by second hand means [75] e.g. direct reporting
would reduce the need for the power-consuming promiscuous mode.
Another future work is based on a new paradigm of networks called the Internet of Things
(IoT). A preliminary work in this field is presented by Amouri et. al [76], a future work is dealing
with a network of two different clusters size with different number of nodes in each cluster as
shown in figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1 A scheme for a multi-cluster IoT network.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
Acronym

Description

MANET

Mobile AdHoc Network

WSN

Wireless Sensor Network

IoT

Internet of Things

AMoF

Accumulate Measure of Fluctuation

DR

Detection Rate

TPR

True Positive Rate

TNR

True Negative Rate

FPR

False Positive Rate

FNR

False Negative Rate

NUT

Node Under Test

UB

Upper Bound

LB

Lower bound

FS

Fitted Slope

Tr

Reporting time

Ts

Sampling time
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